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 CHAPTER SIX  
 The Scope for 
Wisdom: Early Buddhism 
on Reasons and Persons 
 JAKE H.  DAVIS 
 To this extent,  Ā nanda, one is born and ages and dies and passes away and 
takes birth again. To this extent there is a path for designations, a path for 
expressions, a path for concepts. To this extent there is scope for wisdom. 
To this extent the cycle continues for being here to be conceived. That is, to 
the extent that name- and- form together with consciousness continue through 
dependence on one another. ( Mah ā nid ā na Sutta , DN II 63– 64) 1 
 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The denial that persons exist, in some ultimate sense, is widely understood to be 
a central Buddhist doctrine. In  Consequences of Compassion , Charles Goodman 
(2009) suggests that in a range of classical Buddhist sources some version of this 
metaphysical thesis about persons helps to underwrite an ethical thesis, that we 
ought to minimize the total amount of suffering there is in the world. There is a 
compelling connection between these two ideas: since we all agree that our own 
suffering is to be avoided, if there are ultimately no distinctions between persons, 
then perhaps one ought to act or live in whatever way will most effectively reduce 
all of the suffering there is in the world, regardless of whose it is. Nonetheless, as 
a characterization of early Buddhist thought this proposal is doubly mistaken. The 
Buddha, as he is portrayed in the early Buddhist discourses, endorses neither the 
metaphysical claim, that persons on some ultimate level do not exist, nor the ethical 
claim, that we ought to live in whatever way will minimize the total amount of 
suffering there is in the world. Instead, early Buddhism has a different, and more 
novel, contribution to make to contemporary ethical thought. Or so I will argue. 2 
 Damien Keown, in his seminal work  The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (1992), 
argues that Buddhist ethics cannot be understood within a Consequentialist 
framework, one that bases ethical claims about how we ought to live on 
considerations about the consequences for aggregate happiness or suffering in the 
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world. Keown suggests instead that Buddhist ethics has more in common with the 
teleological approach to Virtue Ethics characteristic of Aristotle’s ethical thought. 
While I will also point out in passing some problems with Keown’s Aristotelian 
interpretation, Goodman offers a much more extensive argument against Keown’s 
reading. It is difficult to find decisive evidence either for a teleological or for a 
Consequentialist reading, however, for at least two reasons. First, the structural 
similarities between the two approaches can make them seem indistinguishable in 
practice; Goodman highlights the especially close similarities between Aristotelian 
versions of Virtue Ethics and a theory that focuses on the consequences for 
aggregate welfare of having certain character traits (2009: 41ff.). Second, in part 
because the Buddhist sources are mainly focused on practical ethical questions 
rather than on ethical theory, they are relatively amenable to multiple different 
lines of theoretical interpretation. 
 One strategy Goodman employs to tip the balance in favor of his Consequentialist 
reading is to appeal to a connection between reductionism about persons and 
Consequentialism in ethics that has been brought to light by Derek Parfit in his 
influential  Reasons and Persons . Goodman suggests that just such a connection is 
present, at least implicitly, in a range of classical Buddhist sources. Parfit, in turn, 
explicitly claims that “ Buddha would have agreed ” with his reductionist view about 
persons (1984: 273, emphasis in original). 
 Both Parfit and Goodman suggest that the reductionist view about persons 
helps to lend credence to ethically demanding Welfare- Consequentialist ethical 
theories, approaches that determine whether an action is right by appealing to its 
consequences for total happiness or suffering in the world. This approach suggests 
an important connection between two central aspects of Buddhist thought: the 
universal characteristic of nonself (P ā li  anatt ā ) and the nature of what is ethically 
wholesome (P ā li  kusala ). And this, in turn, suggests one way in which Buddhist 
meditation could lead to ethical insight. A common theme across contemporary 
Buddhist traditions is the suggestion that meditation practices offer a means for 
individuals to realize the metaphysical truth that there is no self. Perhaps Buddhist 
meditation offers access, of a kind that has been relatively absent from Western 
thought, to the grounds for believing that we ought to act so as to minimize suffering 
for all beings. If so, this would be an important contribution to contemporary ethical 
thought and practice. 
 While there is a kernel of truth in this suggestion, I think that the distinctive 
contribution of Buddhist approaches to ethics lies elsewhere. In a discourse in the 
 Sa ṃ yutta Nik ā ya (SN), the Buddha says, “It is in just this fathom- long carcass with 
perception and mind that I make known the world, the cause of the world, the 
cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the world” (SN 
I 144). Commenting on this discourse, Bhikkhu Bodhi explains: 
 The world with which the Buddha’s teaching is principally concerned is “the 
world of experience,” and even the objective world is of interest only to the 
extent that it serves as the necessary external condition for experience. (Bodhi 
2000: 394) 
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 This is not to say that the Buddha’s ethical teachings are not concerned with the 
effects of one’s actions on other persons in the external world; as we will see, they 
are. However, I will suggest that early Buddhist ethics is concerned with the external 
consequences of one’s actions in virtue of the fact that one ought to have the sort of 
motivations that would make us concerned about such things. And this is a fact that 
each of us can experience for ourselves. It is something that one can know and see 
from within, and only from within, one’s world of experience. 
 The line of thought that I draw out from the early Buddhist discourses does not 
ground its claims, metaphysical or ethical, in a perspective that abstracts away from 
one’s particular experience of the world in order to adopt the sort of objectivity 
that Thomas Nagel (1986) calls “the view from nowhere.” On the contrary, the 
suggestion is instead to inhabit more fully one’s own subjective experience of the 
world. The point is to watch how experience comes to be and how it ceases to be 
see, so as to see and know the nature of experience and the conditions under which 
one comes to have experience of the world at all. Indeed, this is an ethical claim: the 
characterization of the world of experience, its cause, its cessation, and the path to 
its cessation that is given in the  Sa ṃ yutta passage above is a variant of the four noble 
truths; thus the unsatisfactoriness ( dukkha ) inherent in the world of experience 
is to be comprehended ( pariññeyya ), its cause is to be abandoned ( pah ā tabba ṃ ), 
its cessation is to be directly experienced ( sacchik ā tabba ṃ ), and the path to that 
cessation is to be cultivated ( bh ā vetabba ṃ ) (as at SN V 422). 
 Two recent evaluations of the early Buddhist doctrine of  anatt ā (nonself) by Sue 
Hamilton (2000) and Alexander Wynne (2010) appeal centrally to this emphasis 
on understanding the conditional nature of the world of experience. Both authors 
argue that the kind of reductionism about persons appealed to by Goodman, while 
very much present in later developments of Buddhist thought, nonetheless stands 
in opposition to a more subtle and profound approach to persons and subjectivity 
found in earlier layers of Buddhist thought. These historical claims, and the 
methodologies employed by Hamilton and Wynne, are not without controversy. For 
one, the arguments of both Hamilton and Wynne are based primarily on the P ā li 
Nik ā yas. This body of texts has been preserved in the Therav ā da Buddhist traditions 
of Southeast Asia, with only minor variations between different recensions. Though 
the Nik ā yas have often been assumed by Western scholars to be the earliest and 
most authoritative record available of what the historical Buddha taught, this is 
problematic as a general assumption. For one, research into parallel versions of the 
early Buddhist discourses translated in the Chinese  Ā gamas as well as in Tibetan 
versions and some Sanskrit fragments has suggested a means of identifying earlier 
and later elements of crucial discourses. This approach is important because it offers 
a means for historical analysis that specifically does not privilege the Therav ā da 
tradition as having preserved in all cases the earliest or most authoritative version 
of a teaching (An ā layo 2011, 2012a). Nonetheless, the emphasis on the world 
of experience that Bodhi, Hamilton, Wynne, and others find evident in the P ā li 
Nik ā yas, as an independent philosophical proposal, has novel and important 
contributions to make to contemporary ethical theory (Davis 2014). Moreover, 
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the implications of this emphasis on subjective experience for understanding the 
structure of ethical thought within the P ā li Nik ā yas are largely yet to be drawn out. 
Finally, these implications may well apply to understanding the structure of early 
Buddhist ethics more generally, if further comparative research offers evidence from 
other recensions of the early Buddhist discourses for a similar approach to the world 
of experience and to the doctrine of nonself in particular. 
 I cannot attempt here a comprehensive survey of scholarship on Buddhist ethics, 
or even that focused on the early Buddhist discourses. 3 Instead, my aim here is to 
bring out one distinctive and philosophically promising aspect of the approach to 
ethics found in these texts. In Section Two I survey some evidence for the nature 
of ethical reasoning in early Buddhist thought. Section Three turns to the nature 
of persons, developing an approach to understanding nonself as a characteristic of 
one’s subjective experience of the world. Section Four extends this same approach 
to understand the nature of objectivity in early Buddhist ethics. Briefly sketching 
an account that I have defended in more detail elsewhere (Davis 2014), I propose 
that the connection drawn between mindfulness and wisdom in the early Buddhist 
discourses offers a distinctive and promising approach to grounding ethical claims. 
 2.  ETHICAL REASONING IN EARLY BUDDHISM 
 In the well- known discourse to the K ā l ā mas, the Buddha rejects certain kinds 
of epistemic principles in ethics. He advises the K ā l ā mas not to rely only on the 
authority of a tradition or hearsay or texts or a teacher, and also not to rely only on 
the basis of logical reasoning or inference or probability or acceptance of a view. The 
Buddha’s positive advice begins as follows: 
 When you know for yourselves “these qualities ( dhamm ā ) are unwholesome 
( akusal ā ), these qualities are blameworthy ( s ā vajj ā ), these qualities are criticized by 
the wise ( viññugarahit ā ), these qualities when taken on and adopted lead to harm 
and suffering ( ahit ā ya dukh ā ya ), then you should abandon them ( pajaheyy ā tha ) 
. . .” When you know for yourselves “these qualities are wholesome ( kusal ā ), 
these qualities are blameless ( anavajj ā ), these qualities are praised by the wise 
( viññuppasatth ā ), these qualities when taken on and adopted lead to welfare 
and happiness ( hit ā ya sukh ā ya ), then you should enter and remain in them 
( upasampajja vihareyy ā tha ).” (AN I 189– 190) 
 Both in the case of the unwholesome and in the case of the qualities ( dhamm ā ) 
he characterizes as ethically unwholesome, and also in the case of the qualities 
that he characterizes as ethically wholesome, immediately after giving this advice, 
the Buddha runs through some examples. The K ā l ā mas agree that when greed 
( lobha ), hatred ( dosa ), or delusion ( moha ) arise inside a person, they lead to harm 
and suffering. The Buddha points out that someone overcome by such qualities 
violates the ethical principles known in Buddhism as the five precepts, that is, 
he kills, steals, commits adultery, lies, and encourages others to do those things, 
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all of which is for long- term harm and suffering. When the opposites of these 
qualities arise in a person, he does not kill, steal, commit adultery, lie, or encourage 
others to do those things, all of which is for long- term welfare and happiness. 4 
Having thought through such consequences for suffering and happiness, the 
K ā l ā mas become clear as to which of these qualities of heart are unwholesome, 
blameworthy, criticized by the wise, leading to harm and suffering, and which of 
these qualities of heart are wholesome, praiseworthy, praised by the wise, leading 
to welfare and happiness. 
 For our purposes here there are two especially notable features of this passage. 
For Western philosophers, it will be notable that the focus in this discussion about 
what is praiseworthy and what blameworthy is not focused in the first case on 
the evaluation of actions, nor the evaluation of long- term character traits. It does 
take motivational states, including what might be called a goodwill, as the central 
focus for the purpose of evaluating praise- and blame- worthiness. But the early 
Buddhist approach is not then to evaluate the goodness of a goodwill in terms of 
its conformance with rational principles such as universalizability. In short, the 
proposal offered here for how to go about evaluating praise- and blame- worthiness 
is distinct from any of the major theories of Western ethics, a point that makes it 
worthy of notice by philosophers used to operating mainly with those paradigms. 
As Goodman notes, “The Buddhist technical terms we might be inclined to translate 
as ‘virtuous’ (such as P ā li  kusala , Skt.  ku ś ala , Tib.  dge ba ) are, in the first instance, 
applied to occurrent mental states” (2009: 195). The foundational focus, in this 
discourse with the K ā l ā mas, and more generally in the early Buddhist discourses, is 
on greed ( lobha ), hatred ( dosa ), delusion ( moha ), and their opposites. Elsewhere, 
I have called such states “qualities of heart” (Davis 2014). Among all the possible 
states ( dhamm ā ) a person might experience, it is these occurrent emotional, conative, 
and cognitive states that the early Buddhist texts take as the foundational focus of 
ethical discussion. 5 
 In one well- known line from the  A ṅ guttara Nik ā ya (AN), the Buddha says, “It 
is  cetan ā (intention or motivation) that I call  kamma ” (AN III 415). Scholars such 
as Richard Gombrich (2006: 51) have argued that in the broader Indian context 
this suggestion was revolutionary, turning the notion of morally valenced action 
inward, focusing ethics on one’s psychological states rather than the consequences 
of one’s outer actions. This emphasis on internal motivations suggests to Keown that 
Buddhist ethics cannot be Consequentialist: 
  It is the preceding motivation ( cetan ā ) that determines the moral quality of the 
act and not its consequences. In Buddhism acts have bad consequences because 
they are bad acts— they are not bad acts because they have bad consequences. 
(Keown 1992: 178) 
 Keown offers an extended comparison of  cetan ā with Aristotle’s conception of 
 prohairesis , and sees a broader parallel as well between the structure of Buddhist and 
Aristotelian approaches to ethics. He points, for instance, to another passage from 
the  A ṅ guttara Nik ā ya where wholesome conduct ( kusala s ī la ) is said ultimately to 
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have knowledge and vision of release as its purpose ( attha ) and benefit ( ā nisa ṃ sa ) 
(AN V 2). The discourse immediately following describes this as a natural process, 
saying that for someone with wholesome conduct there is no need to form the 
intention ( cetan ā ) for freedom from regret to arise. Likewise for each progressive 
stage in the series, 
 For one with freedom from regret . . . joy . . . tranquility . . . ease . . . concentration 
. . . knowledge and vision of things as they are . . . disenchantment . . . dispassion 
. . . there is no need to form the intention “may I realize knowledge and vision 
of release.” It is just the nature of things ( dhammat ā ) that one disenchanted and 
dispassionate will realize knowledge and vision of release . . . Thus, bhikkhus, one 
state flows into the next state, one state fills up the next state for the sake of going 
from the near shore to the far shore. (AN V 2– 4) 
 Just as Aristotelian ethics is grounded in a particular notion of flourishing 
( eudaimonia ), Keown argues, so too Buddhist thought grounds ethical valence in 
the goal of  nibb ā na . He takes both these systems to be teleological in the sense of 
providing a “framework for personal cultivation and accomplishment . . . structured 
in accordance with a specific connection of human nature and its  telos ” (Keown 
1992: 203). Since in this  A ṅ guttara discourse wholesome conduct is said to have 
 nibb ā na as its ultimate purpose and benefit, one might take Keown’s (1992) proposal 
to be that the reason intentions motivated by states such as compassion are worthy 
of cultivation is  just that such states (and not others) are conducive to realizing 
 nibb ā na . If this is the reading that Keown is proposing, however, it goes beyond 
what is found in the discourses themselves. 
 Recall that in the discourse to the K ā l ā mas, having made wholesome and 
unwholesome qualities of heart the focus of ethical evaluation, the Buddha does not 
appeal to considerations about which of these qualities are conducive to  nibb ā na , 
but rather gives examples that distinguish between wholesome and unwholesome 
qualities by appealing to their consequences for welfare. This is a second notable 
feature of the approach to ethical reasoning on display in the discourse to the 
K ā l ā mas precisely whose welfare is to be taken into account. However, in a 
discourse in the  Majjhima Nik ā ya , it is made explicit that one should consider both 
one’s own welfare and that of others. In that discourse, the Buddha starts up a 
conversation with his young son R ā hula on the subject of telling lies in jest; it seems 
that according to multiple commentarial traditions R ā hula was prone to just this vice 
(An ā layo 2011: 342). “For one who feels no shame in telling a deliberate lie,” the 
Buddha says, “there is no evil he would not do. Therefore, one should train oneself 
thus: I will not lie even in jest” (MN I 415). Presumably as a way of elaborating and 
generalizing the point, the Buddha suggests that one ought to reflect before, during, 
and after actions of body, speech, and mind: 
 Did this action of body . . . speech . . . mind lead to my own affliction, to the 
affliction of others, to the affliction of both, was it an unwholesome action 
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of body . . . speech . . . mind, resulting in suffering, bearing fruit in suffering? 
(MN I 415) 
 When a monastic knows on reflection that his action was unwholesome, with 
unhappy results, he ought to confess it and refrain in the future. When he knows 
that his action was wholesome with happy results, he ought to joyously continue to 
train himself in wholesome qualities. 
 It is interesting philosophically that the appeal to consequences here comes 
as an elaboration on the point that one ought never to lie. Act- Consequentialist 
approaches will typically deliver the result that one ought to lie under circumstances 
where that act of lying would lead to overall benefit. However, this is not the case 
for Consequentialist approaches that take rules as the primary focus of ethical 
evaluation. Although Keown ultimately rejects the hypothesis that Buddhist ethics 
is Consequentialist, he concedes that among Consequentialist theories a form of 
negative rule Consequentialism would be the “closest approximation” (1992: 230). 
The general idea of such an approach would be that Buddhist ethics applies the 
precepts against killing, stealing, lying, and so on inflexibly, and that these rules are, 
in turn, justified in virtue of the fact that these are the rules that, when followed 
inflexibly, result in an overall reduction in suffering (Keown 1992: 177). Goodman 
takes up the proposal that Keown ultimately rejects, and argues for a Rule- 
Consequentialist interpretation of early Buddhism and/ or the modern Therav ā da— 
it is not quite clear which, since neither Keown nor Goodman distinguishes carefully 
between the two. 
 I doubt that Rule- Consequentialism is the correct characterization either of early 
Buddhist ethics or of how modern Therav ā da Buddhists reason. In both cases, my 
suggestion is that the central thrust of these approaches is instead to take occurrent 
states of mind as the primary unit of ethical evaluation. The analysis of mercy 
killings offered in the Therav ā da  Abhidhamma and commentaries makes clear that 
the reason such killings are wrong is that even in such cases it is not psychologically 
possible for a person to intentionally take life unless the state of  dosa (hatred or 
aversion) has arisen in the agent’s mind (Gethin 2004). Rupert Gethin notes here the 
commentary’s suggestion that the painful, unwholesome states that actually motivate 
intentional killing are not easy for those who are not wise to notice ( dujj ā nam eta ṃ 
puthujjaneh ī ), because these states are fleeting and occur close in time to wholesome 
states such as compassion; this traditional analysis is repeated by modern Therav ā da 
teachers both in Thailand and in Burma. 6 
 We have seen that the Buddha’s advice to the K ā l ā mas similarly focuses on 
qualities ( dhamm ā ) such as greed ( loba ), hatred ( dosa ), and delusion ( moha ), as well 
as their opposites. On an approach that takes qualities of heart as the central focus 
of ethical evaluation in this way, conclusions about which  actions are wholesome 
and unwholesome that follow from this may well vary widely depending on 
particular circumstances. Certain kinds of actions, those that cannot be performed 
without involving unwholesome states, may never be wholesome. However, since 
the ethically charged situations we find ourselves in are complex, it is not always 
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clear ahead of time what a person motivated by wholesome qualities of heart would 
do. This helps to accommodate the sense that Buddhist ethics is “Particularist,” as 
Charles Hallisey (1996) puts it. 7 The idea here, echoed by other recent interpreters 
(Heim 2014; Garfield in press) is that Buddhist ethical texts are not in the business of 
offering a general system from which to derive decision procedures for how to act or 
how to be. Rather, the right thing to do will vary in ways that are not codifiable— in 
some cases even breaking the precepts may be the virtuous thing to do, and Buddhist 
ethical texts are instead in the business of inculcating the right sorts of emotional 
responses to the complex situations that human beings have to navigate. 
 One might wish to insist that even about emotional responses, the Buddhist 
ethical texts offer no principled general means of determining which are to be to 
be cultivated and which are to be abandoned. One aim of this chapter is to argue 
that such a wholesale Particularist reading would be mistaken. The kind of context 
sensitivity about right action that is rightly recognized by interpreters such as 
Hallisey can follow even from an ethical theory that offers a different, principled 
foundation. By generalizing the structure of the  K ā l ā ma Sutta , for instance, a 
Welfare- Consequentialist theory could take emotional responses as the primary focus 
of ethical evaluation, rather than acts or rules or character traits. 8 On this approach, 
if greed or hatred or delusion as a type of occurrent mental state leads in general 
to maximizing the total suffering in the world, then when it arises internally in us, 
we ought to abandon it and not act out of it. Likewise, if their opposites typically 
lead to minimizing the total suffering in the world, then when such qualities of 
heart arises internally in us, we ought to cultivate them in our thoughts, speech, and 
actions. This “Quality- Consequentialism” can, I think, offer a close approximation 
of early Buddhist ethical conclusions. Though I suggest in Section Four how it fails 
to get right the structure of early Buddhist ethics at a more foundational level, it 
nonetheless would offer justification for many of the same ethical claims to which 
early Buddhist thought is committed. 
 Perhaps the strongest evidence for thinking the foundational structure of early 
Buddhist ethics is Consequentialist comes from the  B ā hitika Sutta and its parallel in 
the Chinese  Madhyama- ā gama . In this discourse, the Venerable  Ā nanda answers a 
series of questions asked by King Pesanadi: 
 Now, Venerable  Ā nanda, what kind of bodily behaviour is censured by wise 
recluses and Brahmins? Any bodily behaviour that is unwholesome, great king 
. . . what kind of bodily behaviour is unwholesome? Any bodily behaviour 
that is blameworthy . . . what kind of bodily behaviour is blameworthy? Any 
bodily behaviour that brings affliction . . . what kind of bodily behaviour brings 
affliction? Any bodily behaviour that brings that has painful results . . . Now, 
Venerable  Ā nanda, what kind of bodily behaviour has painful results? Any bodily 
behaviour, great king, that leads to one’s own affliction, or to the affliction of 
others, or to the affliction of both, and on account of which unwholesome states 
increase and wholesome states diminish. Such bodily behaviour is censured by 
wise recluses and Brahmins, great king. (MN II 114) 
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 In the parallel to this discourse preserved in the Chinese  Madhyama- ā gama , 
 Ā nanda describes the behavior that “the wise detest” as actions that harm oneself 
and others and both, that “destroy wisdom and foster evil,” and that does not lead 
to awakening and  nibb ā na (An ā layo 2007: 159ff.). He goes on to say that those 
who undertake such conduct “do not know according to reality” what things should 
and should not be eliminated, what things should and should not be accomplished. 
He concludes that because of this ignorance, “wholesome things decrease and 
unwholesome things increase.” 
 The discussions with the K ā l ā mas and with R ā hula above point to consequences 
for welfare as ethically relevant. Not only do both the P ā li and Chinese versions 
of the  B ā hitika Sutta repeat this point, but the structure of the discourse also lends 
further support to a Consequentialist interpretation. Quoting the P ā li version, 
Goodman (2009: 62) points out that “it is natural to interpret the passage as 
defining the earlier expressions successively in terms of the later ones,” as 
giving successively more foundational accounts of what it is for a behavior to be 
something one ought not to do. 9 On this reading of the P ā li version,  Ā nanda is 
saying that what makes it the case that certain bodily behaviors are unwholesome 
is the fact that those behaviors are blameworthy; what makes it the case those 
bodily behaviors are blameworthy is that they bring affliction; what makes it the 
case that those bodily behaviors bring affliction is that they have painful results. 
The final stage of this series of definitions proposes that what makes it the case 
those bodily behaviors have painful results is the fact they that have negative 
consequences for the agent’s welfare and the welfare of others, but also the fact 
that such behaviors increase unwholesome states and diminish wholesome states, 
and (in the  Madhyama- ā gama version) that such behaviors are not conducive to 
realizing  nibb ā na. 
 Maximizing Consequentialist theories define what is right as what maximizes 
the good. The good can then be defined in various ways, yielding different forms 
of Consequentialism. An objective list theory of the good simply gives a list of the 
goods there are, denying that further noncircular explanation can be offered for 
why these are the goods to maximize. Goodman suggests that the P ā li version of the 
 B ā hitika Sutta might articulate just this sort of structure: 
 The series of definitions terminates with reference to two aspects of the 
consequences of the action: its tendency to promote “affliction”, that is, painful 
feelings, and its tendency to cause bad states of character to increase and good 
ones to diminish. If this final formulation represents the most fundamental 
account of what makes an action wrong, then the moral theory of the  B ā hitika 
Sutta is a consequentialist theory with a two- part objective list theory of the 
good. (Goodman 2009: 62) 
 Earlier in his book, Goodman (2009: 41) describes a “universalist consequentialism 
based on an objective list theory, such that the list of intrinsic goods includes 
character traits,” and identifies this with what Thomas Hurka calls “Perfectionist 
Consequentialism.” Goodman argues that despite their similarities, perfectionist 
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Consequentialism can be distinguished from Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. His central 
suggestion is that whereas Virtue Theories are agent- relative, Consequentialist 
theories are agent- neutral. 
 This agent- neutrality leads Consequentialist theories to be radically revisionary 
and make ethical demands on us far beyond the demands made by most conventional 
moral systems. According to a Virtue Theoretic approach, an agent ought to 
do what cultivates her own virtuous character traits. In contrast, perfectionist 
Consequentialism will hold that an agent ought to do whatever maximizes virtue for 
all beings, even if it were to decrease her own virtuous character traits. “That means 
that a character Consequentialist would be willing to make himself worse in order to 
make others better, so long as the total amount of virtue in the universe increased” 
(Goodman 2009: 43). Likewise, a Welfare- Consequentialist approach that focused 
on actions, instead of character traits, may suggest that those of us living in wealthy 
countries ought to be willing to reduce our wealth and well- being dramatically in 
order to save the lives of people we have never met. Peter Singer (1972) famously 
argues that if it would be wrong to let a child drown in front of us to save our 
expensive shoes from getting ruined, it is equally wrong to allow a child to die from 
preventable diseases when we could save her by giving up an amount of wealth 
comparable to (or less than) the costs of an expensive pair of shoes. And there are 
many such children. The crux this argument turns on an agent- neutral conception 
of value: the lives of those distant from us have no less value than the lives of those 
we come into contact with. 
 Goodman refers to Parfit in tying the high ethical demands required by 
Consequentialist approaches directly to a reductionist metaphysics of persons: 
 Because of its commitment to agent- neutrality, consequentialism regards the 
divisions between the lives of different individuals as no more significant than 
the differences between different periods of a particular individual’s life. Actions 
that benefit the agent, or the agent’s family and friends, at the expense of beings 
in general are just as irrational as actions that benefit me in the short run but do 
much greater harm to my long- term interests. (Goodman 2009: 44) 
 Goodman suggests that in order to test whether a Virtue Theoretic or a 
Consequentialist framework can be attributed to a particular school of Buddhist 
thought we can look for “characteristics that are distinctive to, or at least indicative 
of, Consequentialism, such as agent- neutrality, extreme demands, injunctions to 
promote the welfare of others, and the ability to draw support from critiques of 
personal identity” (2009: 45). The last of these would seem low- hanging fruit. 
After all, the Buddhist tradition is full of metaphysical critiques of personal identity. 
Moreover, the other considerations may be more equivocal. 
 We have seen that the ethical reasoning evident in the early Buddhist texts does 
emphasize consequences as an important factor. And I have suggested that one 
can construct a Consequentialist account focused on the evaluation of types of 
occurrent mental states that would approximate many of the ethical claims made 
in the early Buddhist discourses. However, many of the instances that we have seen 
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so far of early Buddhist ethical reasoning could also be interpreted along virtue- 
theoretical lines. This is so in part because the formal feature of Consequentialism, 
the maximization of the total good in the external world as determining what is 
right, is not evident in the texts. Even if a maximizing procedure were evident, 
moreover, we might agree that one ought to do what one  thinks will maximize 
welfare for oneself and for others, but suggest that one ought to act in this way 
just in virtue of the fact that that is what a compassionate person would do. For 
instance, the  Vinaya texts portray the Buddha as laying down rules not only in 
order to decrease unwholesome mental states and increase wholesome ones in 
individual monastics, but also for the good of the whole monastic community, for 
the sake of nurturing the public’s faith in the teachings, and for the sustaining of 
the teachings and the discipline (as at Vin. III 21). Since these texts are arguably 
one of the primary sources for understanding early Buddhist ethics, one might 
take this as evidence that early Buddhist ethics does not evaluate acts solely on 
the basis of the qualities of heart they involve. However, we can equally wonder 
why it is the case that one ought to be motivated to lay down rules that serve the 
welfare of the many in this way. And here, a plausible answer is that one ought to 
be motivated in such a way because that is just what a compassionate person would 
do. On such an approach, claims about which character traits or mental states are 
wholesome would again serve as the foundational justification for which acts and 
rules are wholesome. One could offer a similar Virtue Theoretic basis for some 
extreme ethical demands. Thus it might be that someone who has the trait of being 
contented with little, or the state of non- greed, would be motivated naturally to 
give up much of their wealth so as to better serve others; we might see Buddhist 
monasticism as one example of this. 
 I return to these points below. For now, it is enough to note that it is not easy 
to distinguish a Virtue Theoretic approach from a perfectionist Consequentialist 
approach on grounds such as extreme demands and injunctions to promote welfare. 
However, Goodman suggests that the different “metaphysical bases” supporting the 
two theories can help here. It is possible to combine reductionism about persons 
with a Virtue Ethics. Nonetheless, Parfit’s reductionism about persons offers 
argumentative support for Consequentialism. And, on the other hand, Aristotle’s 
ethics is grounded in his philosophical biology, in particular its conception of human 
beings as having a natural function. Goodman suggests, then, that if we find in 
Buddhism a claim that persons can be reduced to psychophysical processes and 
do not have an essential nature that can be appealed to as the ground of ethics, 
this should be taken as indirect evidence in favor of a Consequentialist reading of 
Buddhist ethics. 
 3.  THE CHARACTERISTIC OF NONSELF 
 The Discourse on the Characteristic of Nonself, the  Anatta- lakkha ṇ a Sutta , presents 
the Buddha telling his audience in no uncertain terms that physical form, feeling, 
perception, conditioned volitions, and consciousness itself are not to be regarded as 
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self. These five are the  khandhas , often interpreted as “aggregates” (but see note 9). 
The discourse presents the same injunction in regard to each of the five, beginning 
with physical form. “Any physical form whatever, past, present or future, internal 
or external, gross or subtle, base or refined, far or near, is to be viewed as it is with 
right understanding, ‘this is not mine, I am not this, this is not myself ’’’ (SN III 
66). The discourse goes on to say that viewing physical form, feeling, perception, 
conditioned volitions, and consciousness in this way leads to the goal of release 
from suffering. 
 Many later Buddhist expositions have understood this central teaching as a 
claim that in some ultimate sense persons do not exist. Thus in the Questions of 
Milinda, the Elder Buddhist monk N ā gasena explains that although he is known 
as “N ā gasena,” this is just a concept, “In the ultimate sense there is no person to 
be found here” (Miln. 28). Parfit (1984: 273, 502) cites this line from N ā gasena as 
evidence that the Buddha would agree with the reductionist view. N ā gasena, in turn, 
cites as support a poem attributed to the nun Vajir ā , found in the  Sa ṃ yutta Nik ā ya: 
 Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word “chariot” is used, So, when the 
aggregates are present, There’s the convention “a being.” 
 It’s only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. 
Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases. (SN I 135 in 
Bodhi 2000: 230) 
 N ā gasena explicates Vajir ā ’s chariot analogy by distinguishing between the concept 
( paññatti ) of a person and what is “found” in the ultimate sense ( paramattho ). There 
are various parts of a chariot: the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body, and so on. 
Dependent on the pole, and the axle, and the wheels, and the body and so on, 
there is the concept  CHARIOT . In the same way, dependent on hair, nails, blood, and 
other aspects of material form, dependent on feeling, and on perception, and on 
conditioned volitions, and on consciousness, there is the concept  N Ā GASENA , “but in 
the ultimate sense there is no person to be found here” (Miln. 28). 
 N ā gasena holds that the concept of a person arises in a certain kind of dependence 
on mental and physical events, but it is not clear exactly how he conceives of this 
relation, since he denies that a person is (just) these mental and physical events. 
Thus it is not clear that N ā gasena and Parfit are advancing exactly the same position. 
There are, nonetheless, important similarities between the two. For Parfit, to hold a 
reductionist thesis about nations or persons is not to deny that either exist, but rather 
to deny that they are “separately, or independently, real.” To hold a reductionist thesis 
about nations is to hold that the existence of nations “just involves the existence of 
citizens, living together in certain ways”; correspondingly, to hold a reductionist 
thesis about persons is to hold that existence of persons involves “nothing more 
than the occurrence of interrelated mental and physical events” (Parfit 1984: 340– 
341). N ā gasena explicitly agrees with Parfit that a person is not something other 
than these mental and physical events. This is, of course, what makes both of them 
opposed to the metaphysical claim that the self is some substantial thing over and 
above interrelated mental and physical events; this far N ā gasena and Parfit are in 
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agreement with the early Buddhist texts. For my purposes here, however, it is also 
important to notice a further parallel between these two theorists, in the perspective 
implicit in the analogies that they each adopt. 
 We look at a chariot and its parts from outside. There is no such thing as taking 
the chariot’s perspective, imagining what it must be like for the chariot to ride 
over a rough surface or to be the king’s own favorite vehicle. We do not perceive 
chariots as having an experiential perspective on the world. Similarly, when Parfit 
imagines a nation as constituted by its citizens and their relations, he seems to adopt 
a viewpoint that regards its citizens and their relations from above, as it were. The 
situation with persons is quite different. We can and do (if not always enough) relate 
to other people by imaginatively taking their perspective, imagining what it must be 
like to inhabit their experience of the world. N ā gasena and Parfit invite us to take up 
not the perspective of persons from the inside, but rather a perspective on persons 
from outside. By employing the analogies they offer, we regard pleasure and pain, 
perceptions and consciousness as objects in the world in the way that the parts of a 
chariot are objects in the world. 
 On my reading, the early Buddhist approach doctrine of nonself is not based on 
taking up such a perspective on experience from outside the world of experience. We 
can see this by turning back to the  Anatta- lakkha ṇ a Sutta . The Buddha offers here 
an abridged argument for the conclusion that physical form, feeling, perception, 
conditioned volitions, and consciousness are not self: 
 If the body were self, bhikkhus, it would not bring affliction, and we would get 
[our wish] that the body be like this and not like that. But because the body is 
non- self, bhikkhus, it does bring affliction, and we don’t get [our wish] that the 
body be like this and not like that. (SN III 66) 
 Martin Adam’s (2010) presentation of the formal structure of the Buddha’s 
argument here is instructive: 
 If there were a Self, he asserts, it would be that aspect of the person over which 
one has control. We do not have control over any of the five aggregates. The five 
aggregates are all that a person is. The implication is clear: there is no self. (Adam 
2010: 246– 247) 
 As Adam notes, the third premise in this argument— that the five aggregates are 
all that a person is— is both necessary for the argument to go through and is also not 
evident in the text. He assures us nonetheless that “this is a safe enough assumption 
from the Buddhist perspective” (Adam 2010: 247, n. 14). However, this is not a safe 
assumption. Gethin puts it well: 
 The five  khandhas , as treated in the  nik ā yas and early  abhidhamma , do not exactly 
take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is 
not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the 
understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of 
the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level  r ū pa, vedan ā , saññ ā , 
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sa ṃ kh ā ras, and viññ ā ṇ a are presented as five aspects of an individual being’s 
experience of the world. (Gethin 1986: 49) 
 Here, the point is not that early Buddhist sources see there being something to 
a person in addition to or apart from the  khandhas . Rather the point is that the 
 khandha analysis is not an analysis of what a person is, it does not take the person 
as its object nor as an object. It is instead an analysis of the lived experience of 
a subject, from within. For this reason it could not, in principle, tell us whether 
or not there is something to a person in addition to or apart from the  khandhas . 
In order to determine that a chariot is nothing more than its parts in a certain 
kind of functional relation, we adopt a perspective on these parts from outside of 
them. Similarly, in order to determine that the  khandhas are all that a person is, we 
would have to examine physical form, feeling, perception, conditioned volitions, 
and consciousness from outside of the person’s subjective perspective. 
 However, the  Anatta- lakkha ṇ a Sutta is not committed to adopting this external, 
objective perspective on a world of experience because it does not assert the idea that 
the five  khandhas are all that a person is. Moreover, that premise is not necessary 
because the conclusion that Adam draws from that premise, that there is no self, is 
also not drawn in the discourse. Of course, Adam’s reconstructed argument merely 
recapitulates a dominant understanding of the argument in the  Anatta- lakkha ṇ a 
Sutta . Nonetheless, the fact that the final two out of the four steps in this dominant 
interpretation are not evident in the text should give us pause. Perhaps a better 
reading is available. 
 Recent work by Hamilton and Wynne goes a long way in this direction. Some 
scholars have argued that the Buddhist discourses fail to explicitly deny the existence 
of a self because these texts are instead implicitly committed to the existence of some 
subtle kind of self (for a recent example, see Albahari 2011). It is important to note, 
however, that denial and assertion are not the only two possible responses to the 
metaphysical question of whether there is a self. Neither asserting nor denying that 
there is a self, one can also reject the question, as the Buddha of the early discourses 
does with the set of metaphysical questions left unexplained ( avy ā kata ). 10 Indeed, the 
 Sabb ā sava Sutta characterizes both the view that there is a self and also the view that 
there is no self as “a thicket of views” (MN I 8). Hamilton and Wynne each in effect 
offer a textual rationale for why, within an early Buddhist framework, the question 
of whether there is a self ought to be rejected. Both build on the insight noted 
above from Gethin, that the  khandhas are offered as a kind of phenomenological 
analysis of human experience from within. And both come to the conclusion that the 
dominant understanding of early Buddhism as taking a reductionist stance toward 
the self misses the point of at least some central Nik ā ya discourses. 
 For Hamilton (2000: 129), “selfhood is neither the question nor in question.” 
Instead, the essential project for the early Buddhist texts is to understand the 
cognitive processes that make possible the experience of objects in the external 
world. By understanding how we come to experience things in the world, we 
understand also the limits of what we can know through experience. In particular, 
“understanding dependent origination, in the sense that subjectivity and objectivity 
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are mutually conditioned, one  will no longer ask questions about existence” 
(Hamilton 2000: 184, emphasis in the original). The structures we perceive in the 
world, the parts of a chariot or the parts of human body, appear to us as objects 
existing in space and time independent of us because of the constructive nature 
of cognitive processes. But precisely because objects are constructed in this way 
through our subjective processes, it is not appropriate to ask about what reality 
these objects have independent of these subjective processes; that is beyond the 
limits of experience. For this reason, it is not appropriate to ask whether the self 
exists or not, as an object in the world; Hamilton points especially to the kinds of 
questions about existence of the self that are dismissed in the  Paccaya Sutta (SN II 
27), such as “am I?” and “am I not?” Here, and also more generally in the P ā li and 
other recensions of the early Buddhist discourses, personal insight into dependent 
co- arising is related to going beyond speculation about the self in the past and future 
(cf. An ā layo 2011: 253). 
 Wynne (2010) arrives at an interpretation very close to Hamilton’s, referring to the 
approach he sees in the early Buddhist texts as doctrine of “epistemic conditioning.” 
Although Wynne’s textual argument draws on an array of sources from the Nik ā yas, 
as well the larger Indic historical context, he says that “the most crucial evidence is 
provided by” the  Mah ā nid ā na Sutta , a portion of which is quoted in the epilogue above 
(Wynne 2010: 138). The central points of the  Mah ā nid ā na ’s critique are threefold, 
on Wynne’s reading. First, it is possible to conceive of one’s own existence when 
conditioned experiences arise; however, it is not appropriate to identify oneself with 
conditioned experiences, since these are changing. But, second, it is not appropriate 
to identify oneself as something apart from these experiences. It might be suggested 
that one can identify not with changing experiences, but with just the subjective 
sense of experiencing. Wynne shows convincingly the  Mah ā nid ā na targets just such a 
suggestion from the  Ch ā ndogya Upani ṣ ad . The Buddha rejects this suggestion on the 
grounds that when experience ceases entirely, it is not possible to conceive of one’s 
own existence as an experiencing subject. For the same reason, however, it is not 
appropriate to identify with something apart from experiences and apart from the 
subjective sense of experiencing itself; it is not possible to have the notion “I am” ( asm ī 
ti ) when there is no experience whatsoever ( sabbaso vedayita ṃ n’ atthi ). In brief, only 
within a world of experience are there the conditions “for being here to be conceived” 
at all, and every aspect within this conditioned world of experience is fleeting, and 
therefore inappropriate to identify with as self. If the argument goes through, there is 
no legitimate basis from which to assert the existence of a self. 
 On my reading, this line of early Buddhist thought is committed to rejecting 
any claim for the existence of a self. However, it is not committed to the assertion 
that there is no self. The move is instead to reject the question of whether there is 
a self, and therefore also all answers to that question, negative as well as positive. 
The central reason for this, brought out nicely by Hamilton and Wynne, is that on 
this early Buddhist approach one cannot assume that any objects exist independent 
of our experience of them. For this reason, the early Buddhist approach cannot be 
reconciled with reductive realism, the idea that persons do not ultimately exist, but 
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are conditioned by, or constructed of, mental and physical processes that themselves 
do ultimately exist. By the same token, however, the approach equally cannot be 
reconciled with an (empirical) idealism that claims that the existence of objects 
consists  only in their being experienced; the point is rather that to ask questions of 
what exists (or not) beyond our experience of them is to go beyond the conditions 
under which anything at all can be known. 11 
 Early Buddhism does, of course, assume the sort of mundane knowledge of things 
and persons in the external world that we all have. However, the idea there could be 
some  more ultimate perspective that sees how things in the external world are  really 
constituted, while clearly present in some later Buddhist developments, seems much 
less evident in the early Buddhist discourses. Indeed, the early discourses do not use 
the term  paramatthato to distinguish a class of things that exist in the external world 
(e.g., mental and physical processes) in a more ultimate sense than other things (e.g., 
persons). 12 The  Mah ā nid ā na claims that as long as there are the conditions for a 
world of experience, to this same extent there is also a path for concepts ( paññatti ), 
a path for terms ( voh ā ra ), and scope for wisdom ( paññ ā ). In contrast, N ā gasena 
seems to appeal to an ideal perspective that goes beyond concepts and yet still could 
give us knowledge of things in the world, and how they are constituted. Thus he 
claims that his name is merely a name ( n ā mamatta ṃ ), a designation ( sa ṅ kh ā ), a 
convention ( samaññ ā ), a concept ( paññatti ), a term ( voh ā ro ), for in the ultimate 
sense ( paramatthato ) there is no person to be found here. 
 We saw in the introduction to this chapter some evidence that the early discourses 
are committed to the notion of a type of wisdom that sees not only the arising of the 
world of experience, but also its cessation. Nothing about this, however, suggests 
that the discourses are committed a type of ideal perspective that sees how things 
in the external world are constituted on some ultimate level. I see little, if any, 
evidence that the early Buddhist discourses take such an ultimate perspective on 
things in the external world to be possible, much less that these discourses take such 
a perspective to be necessary in order to justify metaphysical claims. Even if they 
did, the discourses do not seem to draw inferences from the metaphysical claim that 
there is ultimately no self to ethical claims. And yet, clearly these same discourses 
are shot through and through with ethical claims, about how one ought to live, how 
one ought to act, and how one ought to cultivate one’s mind. How are these claims 
to be justified? 
 4.  MINDFULNESS AND WISDOM 
 It has been observed that despite the sophisticated developments of metaphysical 
and epistemological theory in various traditions of Buddhist philosophy, there is 
comparatively little in the way of the kind of ethical theorizing found in the Western 
tradition. Damein Keown has more recently argued that “although Buddhism has 
normative teachings, it does not have normative ethics” (2006: 50). He notes: 
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 The Five Precepts and the rules of the Vinaya . . . are typically presented as 
injunctions, rather than as conclusions logically deduced from explicitly stated 
values and principles. In other words, the Precepts are simply announced, and 
one is left to figure out the invisible superstructure from which they are derived. 
(Keown 2006: 50) 
 In response, An ā layo suggests that there is an identifiable principle underlying the 
 Vinaya rules for monastics and more generally the ethical injunctions found in early 
Buddhist discourses. Based on a survey of sources from the Chinese  Ā gamas as well 
as from the P ā li  Nik ā yas , An ā layo suggests that “the early Buddhist counterpart to 
normative ethics— as distinct from applied ethics on the one hand and meta- ethics 
on the other— could be found precisely in the notion of purification of the mind 
from the influxes” (An ā layo 2012a: 83). 
 “Influx” here is a translation of the P ā li  ā sava , which An ā layo notes (2012b: 81– 
12) is used in the sense of dangers, disturbances, and hardships that can “flow in” 
to the mind. By guarding the sense doors, eating and living moderately, as well as 
by purifying body, speech, and mind, more generally, one prevents unwholesome 
 dhammas from flowing into the mind. In the pursuit of sense pleasures, the pleasures 
gained are mixed with the hardship and disturbances in the mind due to states such 
as lust. By purifying the mind through sense- restraint, in contrast, one “experiences 
internally an unmixed ease ( sukha )” (as at MN I 181). 
 An ā layo’s identification of the principle underlying early Buddhist ethical 
thought is, to my mind, precisely correct, so far as it goes. Nonetheless, a further 
question can be asked. Why is it that one ought to purify oneself of those states 
identified as  ā sava s by the early Buddhist teachings? Put another way, why is it that 
the wise purify their minds of these states and not other states? I think the answer is 
implicit already in the identification of  ā sava s as dangers and disturbances. We can 
experience for ourselves, internally, both the disturbance of unwholesome states and 
the unmixed ease of wholesome ones. 
 Here, the tight connection between the establishment of mindfulness 
( satipa ṭṭ h ā na ) and the development of wisdom ( paññ ā ) is crucial. I can only briefly 
summarize here an approach to this connection that I develop and defend in detail 
elsewhere (Davis 2014). According to the  Vipall ā sa Sutta , perceptions, thoughts, 
and views can be distorted ( vipall ā sa ) (AN II 52). In the  M ā gandiya Sutta (MN 
I 501ff) and its parallel version in the  Madhyama- ā gama , the Buddha illustrates this 
with an analogy: one with distorted perceptions due to leprosy might want to burn 
his flesh over hot coals, but on being cured he could not be induced to touch the 
coals by any means (An ā layo 2011: 410). In the same way, to those with perceptions 
distorted by craving, aversion, and delusion, the pursuit of sensual pleasure will 
appear enjoyable. But such distortions can be corrected. My suggestion, in brief, 
is that we establish mindfulness so as to gain a full and balanced awareness of all 
aspects of our experience of the world (cf. An ā layo 2014: 243), we purify ourselves 
of distorted perceptions ( saññ ā - vipall ā sa ), and thereby know and see our world of 
experience as it is. Feeling fully the holistic bodily, affective, mental, and perceptual 
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aspects of being in states such as greed, hatred, or delusion, we just could not bear to 
encourage ourselves or others to cultivate such states— they simply involve too much 
internal agitation, disturbance, and hardship. Conversely, feeling fully the relative 
internal ease of states such as generosity, compassion, and clear seeing itself, we 
will naturally be moved to encourage others and ourselves to cultivate these states. 
In this way, I suggest, to the degree human beings from any cultural background 
develop a full and balanced awareness, their ethical judgments will tend to converge. 
In particular, to the degree individuals come to know and see as it is the experience 
of being motivated by various qualities of heart, they will converge in judging that 
we all ought to cultivate certain of these qualities and to purify ourselves of other 
qualities. On my reading, whatever degree of objectivity early Buddhist ethics aspires 
to, this objectivity is to be grounded in these judgments of the wise. 
 It will be noticed that this approach features a strongly Virtue Theoretic appeal to 
the judgments of the wise; nonetheless, two important points distinguish this early 
Buddhist approach from the approaches articulated by Aristotle and other Western 
virtue theorists. Aristotle’s approach in the  Nicomachean Ethics is sometimes 
charged with circularity, in that it simply appeals to the virtues generally accepted 
in his social environment without offering a justification for taking these character 
traits as the virtues. Philippa Foot (2003) attempts to adapt Aristotle’s approach 
so as to underwrite a “species- wide notion of human good,” by appealing to an 
objective, empirical conception of what counts as flourishing for a particular form 
of life. Suggesting that Foot’s variety of naturalism is not Aristotle’s, on the other 
hand, John McDowell (1998: 167ff.) instead seems to embrace an interpretation of 
Aristotle and an independent philosophical position on which there is no position 
from outside a cultural perspective from which to evaluate the relative merits of 
any picture of flourishing or of virtue. The early Buddhist approach helps to chart 
a path between these extremes, agreeing with McDowell that there is no view from 
nowhere from which to objectively determine flourishing or virtue, and yet insisting 
that a sufficient level of convergence in ethical judgment would emerge across 
human cultures, from the first- personal perspective, among individuals who develop 
mindfulness of their own emotional motivations for action. 
 One might challenge this contention by arguing that the perceptual experience 
of some states as internally disturbing and others as internally pleasurable will 
be culturally shaped, such that no amount of developing a full and balanced 
awareness would lead all human beings to agree on which states are wholesome 
and unwholesome. Indeed, one version of this worry can be developed in Buddhist 
terms, by pointing out that all the factors of the Eightfold Noble Path are required 
to develop the kind of full and balanced awareness that knows and sees the world 
of experience as it is. If so, perhaps, these eight factors form a holistic evaluative 
framework such that there is no way to specify independent of these other factors 
what it is to know and see the world of experience as it is, and so no reason to expect 
that individuals from different cultures, even to the degree they were knowing and 
seeing the world of experience as it is, would converge in their judgments of which 
qualities of heart are wholesome and unwholesome. And if so, then early Buddhism 
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might be able to offer techniques (including the Eightfold Noble Path) to cultivate 
qualities of heart that some of us already agree ought to be cultivated, but it offers 
no novel reason for individuals from very different human cultures to agree that 
certain qualities of heart ought to be cultivated. Perhaps. 
 While we have seen above that some of the best evidence for reading the early 
Buddhist texts as Consequentialist comes from the  B ā hitika Sutta , the structure that 
Goodman finds in that discourse may be subject to a similar charge of circularity. We 
noted above that ethically normative terms, such as  kusala , appear in the  B ā hitika 
Sutta (and its Chinese parallel) both as one of the terms being defined and in the 
final definition. 13 Keown takes such points as counting against reading early Buddhist 
ethics as a form of Welfare- Consequentialism such as utilitarianism: 
 Unlike utilitarian theories Buddhism does not define the right independently 
from the good. There exists a clear conceptual relationship between the two, and 
they cannot be defined independently. (Keown 1992: 177) 
 Unfortunately, to the degree Keown is right in his reading of early Buddhist 
ethics, the framework may cease to be of interest to those who do not antecedently 
have faith in the Buddhist value framework as a whole. 
 A Consequentialist reading of Buddhist ethics might do better at providing an 
objective means for justifying a Buddhist framework of values over an Aristotelian 
one, say. This is precisely because a Consequentialist framework, if it is cogent, 
delivers an objective view of ethical reasons from outside any particular subjective 
or evaluative perspective on the world. In order to conceive of the amount of 
aggregate  suffering in the world, and also in order to reduce persons to streams 
of  mental and physical process, one abstracts away from any particular experience 
of the world, in order to adopt an objective perspective on experience itself. 
Nagel (1986: 162) describes this appeal to agent- neutral reasons as “the essence 
of traditional consequentialism.” Consequentialism needs to appeal to reasons for 
action that are agent- neutral in the sense that they do not depend on occupying any 
particular experience of the world. In this sense, modern Consequentialist theories 
depend implicitly on a God’s- eye perspective, what Nagel call’s “the view from 
nowhere.” And this is perhaps not surprising given that, as Julia Driver (2009) notes, 
Consequentialist theories of ethics arose in the West against the background of an 
explicitly theistic and monotheistic metaphysical framework. But this is not the 
background assumed in the early Buddhist texts. 
 Recall Goodman’s suggestion above, that if we can locate in a system of thought 
a reductionist approach to persons, of the sort that would underwrite an agent- 
neutral conception of ethical reasons, this can serve as evidence in favor of reading 
that system of thought as adopting a Consequentialist ethical framework. There is 
evidence for a reductionist approach to persons in later Therav ā da texts such as the 
 Milindapañha. However, the line of thought that Hamilton and Wynne reconstruct in 
the early Buddhist discourses is philosophically opposed to the sort of reductionism 
that Goodman appeals to, and so cannot offer support for a Consequentialist 
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interpretation of early Buddhist ethics. But the implications for the Consequentialist 
reading of early Buddhist ethics are worse than just that. 
 The early Buddhist discourses reject and leave “unexplained” ( avy ā kata ) a set 
of metaphysical questions concerning whether the world is eternal or not, finite or 
not, whether the soul or life- faculty is different from the body or not, and whether 
a Buddha exists or not after death (cf. at MN I. 431 and its parallels, see An ā layo 
2011: 353ff). As Hamilton points out, these questions presuppose that one can 
adopt a perspective on the world as an object independent of one’s experience of it, 
and the existence of lives and bodies as objects in such a mind- independent world. 
On her reading, early Buddhism rejects this presupposition. According to Hamilton, 
if it is the case that 
 space and time are part of the structural characteristics of the experiential world, 
and that that is cognitively dependent, then one can see that the presupposition 
of the transcendental reality of time and space is false, and that the fundamental 
premises on which the questions rest are therefore also false. (Hamilton 
2000: 174) 
 Note that in order to have a conception of what will maximize happiness or 
minimize suffering in the world, one must have a conception of the external world 
as finite. We have seen, for instance, that Goodman suggests how a Consequentialist 
theory focused on virtues will base its ethical judgments on the question of what 
increases “the total amount of virtue in the universe” (2009: 43). I suggested above 
that a Consequentialist theory taking occurrent states of mind as its primary focus 
of ethical evaluation would deliver many of the same ethical judgments that are 
found in the early Buddhist discourses; however, at a more fundamental level such 
an interpretation will need to appeal to some conception of the total good in the 
external world. Hamilton’s analysis offers one principled explanation for why it is 
that the early Buddhist discourses do not make such an appeal. 
 There is a plausible alternative explanation that would appeal to pragmatic 
concerns rather than epistemic ones, arguing that the reason questions such as the 
whether the world is finite are not relevant to suffering and the end of suffering. 
But if so, then by implication a position in ethics that relies on the principle of 
there being a finite amount of suffering in a finite universe must also be rejected. 
In any case, whether for epistemic or pragmatic reasons, nowhere in the early 
Buddhist texts do we find formal procedure for weighing the total consequences 
in the external world of one action or one type of mental state against another, as 
finite and definite quantities, in order to make difficult ethical choices between, say, 
benefiting one set of individuals and benefiting another set of individuals. We noted 
above a number of discourses that do characterize unwholesome behavior as that 
leading to one’s own affliction, to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both. 
However, neither in these formulations nor elsewhere in these texts is a calculus 
proposed for deciding hard cases where we must weigh the suffering of one against 
the suffering of another, no suggestion that we ought to maximize total happiness 
or minimize total suffering conceived as a finite quantity in the universe. In short, 
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there is abundant evidence in the early Buddhist ethics of suggestions that we ought 
to take consequences seriously, but vanishingly little evidence for Consequentialism 
as a principled approach to ethical decision- making. 
 The Consequentialist approach aims at a kind of objectivity that goes beyond 
what the early Buddhist discourses are committed to. On the other hand, I think it is 
clear that the early Buddhist approach is not simply aimed at offering a set of applied 
ethical principles for those who already endorse the Buddhist value framework. 
I cannot offer a comprehensive defense of this interpretive claim here (for a brief 
attempt, see Davis 2015). However, as a first pass, recall the passages from  K ā l ā ma 
Sutta and the  B ā hitika Sutta quoted in Section Two. These texts make ethical claims, 
about which actions and qualities of heart are wholesome and unwholesome, which 
are praiseworthy and blameworthy. These texts do not qualify their ethical claims 
as holding only within the circumscribed set of values held by some particular (sub)
culture. The Buddha, as he is portrayed in the early discourses, is concerned to 
engage with individuals of many different convictions, for the purposes of changing 
their convictions such that they come to value cultivating certain qualities of heart 
and not others. There is no suggestion that he advocates his view about which 
qualities of heart others ought to cultivate  just because it is his view, no better or 
worse than the views of others. The suggestion is instead, I take it, that individuals 
and whole cultures can be mistaken about what is praiseworthy and blameworthy, 
and indeed  are mistaken just to the degree that the qualities of heart they praise and 
blame differ from what is praised and blamed by the wise ones, the Buddha first and 
foremost. Early Buddhism is, in this sense, committed at least to this minimal kind of 
objectivity. Whether the approach that it offers for achieving this minimal objectivity 
can deliver on that promise is a different question. I am optimistic about this, but for 
reasons I cannot defend in detail here (cf. Davis 2014). 
 Whereas Aristotle and some modern value frameworks might suggest that 
righteous anger is appropriate as a response to injustice; early Buddhism disagrees. 
On its own, this is not especially interesting; it is common that different individuals 
and different cultural groups hold opposing fundamental values. What is interesting 
is that the connection drawn between mindfulness and wisdom suggests a way in 
which the early Buddhist approach may offer a means that is independent of the 
Buddhist ethical framework to decide when it is that we as an individual or as a 
whole cultural group are wrong about which qualities of heart are wholesome. In 
a debate between Aristotelians and Buddhists, for instance, both sides can assess 
whether anger is, in fact, wholesome or unwholesome by appealing to the judgments 
that they themselves would make if they were aware in a full and balanced way of 
their own world of experience. If there is indeed some one judgment that both would 
converge on under such conditions, then this opens the possibility of a middle way 
in ethical justification. It avoids both the extreme insistence on absolute objectivity 
based on a “view from nowhere” and the insistence of the cultural relativist that 
there can be no justification of ethical claims outside a particular culture- bound 
evaluative framework. I see early Buddhist ethics as navigating a way between these 
extremes. 
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 5.  CONCLUSION 
 The line of thought that I have brought out from the early Buddhist discourses 
emphasizes that in order to understand reasons and persons, one need not abstract 
away from one’s experience of the world to regard experience objectively, as an 
object in the world in the way that we regard chariots and other dead matter. Rather, 
to the degree that one inhabits one’s world of experience more fully, one knows and 
sees the nature of nonself and also the nature of what is wholesome. 
 Even if this line of thought is implicit in the early Buddhist discourses, it is not 
to be preferred to later Buddhist doctrines  because it dates to an earlier period 
in Buddhist history. Wynne’s historical argument that the Buddhist doctrine of 
epistemic conditioning predates Buddhist reductionism, for instance, is useful 
for my purposes here insofar as it suggests that the philosophical merits of these 
two different strands of thought can be considered separately. When we do that, 
we can see how grounding claims in ethics and metaphysics from within a world 
of experience proves a promising approach for moving forward contemporary 
philosophical debates. 
 This point has methodological implications for the study of non- Western 
philosophical sources. The approach to grounding ethical claims that I sketched 
in Section Four includes aspects that parallel a number of prominent theorists in 
Western moral philosophy, Kant as well as Hume, and Aristotle as well as Mill. 14 
However, the project of looking in Buddhist approaches for parallels within the 
familiar Western categories of philosophical theorizing downplays what is most 
radical, and therefore potentially most instructive, from a Western perspective. More 
fruitful, I think, is to investigate the ways in which the philosophical questions and 
the approaches to these questions that were developed in ancient India or China, for 
instance, might make their own distinctive contributions to contemporary debates 
that are already shaped by the important contributions of philosophers such as 
Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Mill. 15 
 Structuring our investigations in this way puts the burden on studies of ancient 
and foreign systems of thought to show that they have something important to teach 
us. This chapter has largely been focused on showing that what early Buddhist ethical 
thought has to teach is not (just) what Aristotle or Parfit have already taught us. There 
is much more to be said about how the early Buddhist line of thought emphasizing 
epistemic conditions on the world of experience can move forward contemporary 
debates on the nature of persons and the nature of reasons. Nonetheless, the general 
shape of the novel contribution that early Buddhist ethics can make should be clear. 
 From within a world of experience, we see particular beings as suffering. If we 
are in wholesome states rather than unwholesome ones, we respond appropriately 
to their suffering. But this is not because we regard suffering as existing on its own 
as an object in the external world, in the way that we regard parts of chariots and 
other dead matter. We can express compassion as a concern for all beings, and 
even cultivate that state by employing such a notion. Nonetheless, this does not 
suggest that one must employ a conception of the limits of the universe and the total 
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aggregate consequences of each action in order to decide how to act, live, or be. 
Rather, one ought to care about how her actions affect her own and others’ welfare 
in virtue of the fact that the qualities of heart that would lead her to care in this way, 
such as compassion, are qualities of heart that ought to be cultivated. And this is a 
fact that one can discover within, and only within, one’s own world of experience. 
 Throughout the  Nik ā yas , the Buddha’s teachings are characterized as experiential, 
timeless, a come- and- see kind of thing, progressive, to be experienced by the wise 
for themselves ( paccatta ṃ veditabbo viññ ū hi ). On my reading, this last phrase offers 
a particularly helpful key to a better understanding of the ways in which early 
Buddhist thought on reasons and persons aspires to objectivity, and the ways in 
which it does not. The distinctive contribution of early Buddhist ethics is to suggest 
that we each can become wise, coming in this way to know and see for ourselves, 
from within our own experience of the world, which qualities of heart are praised 
and criticized by the wise. 
 NOTES 
 1.  References to the P ā li are to  D ī gha (DN),  Majjhima (MN),  Sa ṃ yutta (SN), or 
 A ṅ guttara Nik ā ya s (AN),  Milindapañha (Miln.), and  Vinaya (Vin.), followed by 
volume and page numbers of the Pali Text Society edition. Translations are my 
own except where otherwise noted. 
 2.  This chapter has benefitted greatly from conversations with Martin Adam, 
Bhikkhu An ā layo, Georges Dreyfus, Laura Guerrero, Stephen Harris, and 
Alexander Wynne. I am very grateful for their suggestions and critiques; the 
remaining errors are, of course, my own. 
 3.  For reasons of space, I focus here on Keown’s and Goodman’s influential analyses 
of Buddhist ethics. In the course of his insightful book on Buddhist reductionism 
and Buddhist anti- realism, Siderits (2003) also offers a Consequentialist 
reconstruction of Buddhist ethics. 
 4.  These qualities of heart are referred to in the K ā l ā ma Sutta negatively, as non- 
greed ( alobha ), non- aversion ( adosa ), and non- delusion ( amoha ). Maria Heim 
refers to this feature of early Buddhist thought as “the presence of absences” and 
argues convincingly that this is “an important feature of this moral psychology that 
identifies experience of absence as the conditions for other experience that cannot 
otherwise occur” (Heim 2014: 79). 
 5.  Ranganathan in “Moral Philosophy: The Right and the Good” ( chapter 1 of this 
book) argues that all instances of  dharma / dhamma be translated with ethical terms. 
In the case of a use of  dhamm ā as a plural noun, as here in the discourse with 
K ā l ā mas, this approach would gloss something like “ethicals” or “ethical states,” 
to be cashed out as elements (states, traits, acts, etc.) “that would fall within the 
ideal ethical theory” or “within the ideal theory of the right and the good”. And 
 dhammat ā , which I translate below as “the nature of things” (as in the case of a 
certain causal progression of psychological states), would instead be translated as 
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“the virtue of things.” I take it that this approach of Ranganathan’s is intended as 
a corrective measure, in the face of allegations that Indian philosophy has lacked 
ethical theorizing (in contrast to metaphysical and epistemological varieties). 
Indian philosophers certainly have plenty of theories about  dharma and about 
 dharmas , so if we do take “dharma” as connoting the subjects of debates about 
the ideal ethical theory, then it is clear that India has not lacked in ethical theory! 
A central point of my chapter is that we could render my point as being that 
certain of the elements that would figure in the ideal  philosophical theory, namely, 
occurrent states such as greed and compassion, are claimed by the early Buddhist 
discourses to be the elements that would figure in the ideal  ethical theory. On 
this approach, we might better translate all instances of  dharma / dhamma with 
instances of “philosophy.” Adopting Wilfrid Sellar’s (1962) characterization or 
philosophy, we could then say that  dharma is concerned with “how things in the 
broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense 
of the term.” On this approach,  dharmas (in the plural) are the things that hang 
together, being the elements that fall within the realm of philosophical debate (and 
not just the subset of that which is ethical). Of course, Sellar’s is but one stance 
within a debate about the nature of  dharma / philosophy, and the early Buddhist 
take might well be another. 
 6.  Gethin (2004: 185) quotes a recollection from Ajahn Buddhadassa’s attitude 
toward death; for a closely parallel account in the Burmese tradition, see Mahasi 
Sayadaw (1992: 80– 81). 
 7.  This being a philosophical term of art, it is worth noting that Hallisey’s use 
of “particularism” (borrowed from Chisholm) has affinities to, if also some 
differences from, Dancy’s use of the term “particularism” within philosophical 
ethics. Dancy uses “particularism” to name the conclusion that “there is nothing 
for . . . moral principles to do” (this following from his “holistic” view of practical 
as well as theoretical reasons), and that “people are quite capable of judging 
how to behave case by case, in a way . . . which shows no need of the sort of 
explicit guidance that a set of principles (of a certain sort) would provide” (Dancy 
2004: 82– 83). 
 8.  Adams’s (1976) “motive utilitarianism” offers an example of a similar approach in 
the Western literature, though not an influential one. 
 9.  I take it Goodman reads  Ā nanda as giving  intensional definitions, as making a 
claim about what it is in virtue of which a state is blameworthy, e.g., rather than 
merely claiming that those states that are blameworthy and those states that bring 
affliction are coextensive. The phrasing of the dialogue, if not the structure, is 
ambiguous between the two. 
 10.  I discuss these briefly below. 
 11.  Hamilton rightly identifies this approach she sees in early Buddhism as a kind of 
“transcendental idealism” akin to Kant’s. I cannot take up in any detail here the 
interesting question of to what degree this approach also resembles that adopted 
by the Pudgalav ā dins. While they do seem to have reached some of the same 
conclusions (viz., that the Buddha’s claim is not that there is no self), the reading 
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of the Nik ā yas espoused by Hamilton and Wynne depends on the idea that we 
should reject the question of whether there is a self because to ask questions of 
what exists (or not) beyond our experience of them is to go beyond the conditions 
under which anything at all can be known. It is not clear that this same reasoning 
lay behind the Pudgalav ā din interpretation. 
 12.  The poem by the nun Vajir ā does speak of there being the convention ( sammuti ) 
of “a being” ( satto ), when the aggregates are present ( khandesu santesu ). But it 
is less clear that this underwrites the sort of distinction between ultimate and 
conventional that N ā gasena appeals to. Wynne (2010) argues, controversially, that 
this poem represents a significant stage in the historical progression toward the 
reductive realism evident in N ā gasena’s formulation, for it speaks of the  khandhas 
as existing things, among which “no being is found” ( nayidha satt ū palabbhati ). 
If the poem does depend on the notion of an ultimate perspective on how things 
are constituted in the world, as opposed to how they appear conventionally, then 
perhaps Wynne is correct about the philosophical point. However, according to 
the argument noted above from An ā layo (2012a), if there is an answer to the 
historical question of whether the poem is to count as belonging to early Buddhist 
thought, this would be best to assess from a comparative perspective. 
 13  Moreover, the actions initially identified as unwholesome, for which later 
definitions are offered, are just those actions that would be criticized by people 
who are wise; this is a point brought out with special force in the Chinese parallel 
to the B ā hitika Sutta, and in the Burmese and Ceylonese versions of the P ā li 
discourse (An ā layo 2007: 173, n. 15). 
 14  I have not addressed the former two in this chapter; for more on similarities to 
and differences from Kant, Hume, Aristotle, and Mill, as well as contemporary 
theorists of ethics and metaethics, see Davis (2014). 
 15  In this I echo a number of recent scholars of Buddhist ethics (Hallisey 1996; 
Heim 2014; Garfield in press) including Keown himself (2006), and in a recent 
conference presentation talk (Contemporary Perspectives on Buddhist Ethics, 
Columbia University, October 6, 2011). 
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